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Proposals for the Simulation of Soviet Evasion and Harassment Tactics for Use during the Cloud Cap 9(A) Program

A. Purpose and Limitations

1. The purpose of this paper is to propose some guidelines for the simulation of certain techniques of evasion and harassment that might be introduced in the field tests presently planned for the Cloud Cap 9(A) program.

2. The applicability of these proposals is limited by the following conditions and assumptions:

a. The techniques proposed are designed for use in simulation of inspection of declared production facilities. No attempt is made to provide techniques, especially applicable, to inspection of undeclared production facilities although some of the proposals would be applicable to both cases.

b. Some contractor participation is required for the proposed exercises; however, an attempt was made to keep this at a minimum because it was assumed that extensive and expensive operations involving the contractor would not be possible.

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c. Although a large number of possible modes of evasion and harassment were considered, only certain of these are proposed for simulation during field exercises. Because the likely Soviet environment cannot be duplicated realistically, other modes, which result from Soviet centralized security and control of transportation, housing, etc., were eliminated. Furthermore, simulation of harassment techniques involving subversion and intimidation of the inspectors is not proposed.

3. A noticeable decline in the quality and accuracy of inspector reporting is expected as a result of simulated evasion and harassment techniques. However, this decline could be measured only if the performance of inspectors operating under conditions of evasion and harassment could be compared with that of inspectors operating without such conditions. It should be emphasized that due to the impossibility of duplicating the Soviet environment, the expected decline in the quality of inspector reporting may not result.

B. Procedure

1. Prior to the implementation of any evasion and harassment tactics into the field test exercises, the inspection teams should be given an

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intensive briefing, lasting perhaps one or two days. This briefing would be divided into two parts: 1) intelligence, and 2) evasion and harassment. The first part, to be given by production analysts, would deal with the plant from an intelligence standpoint, giving plant features and layout, items in production, estimated capability, SOV type, configuration, and performance, declared production rate, key personnel, etc. In short, it should be an abbreviated version of the type of briefings that would be given to inspectors leaving for the Soviet Union. It is not considered advisable that this briefing provide the inspector with an intimate knowledge of the plant and all its functions, since this information may never be obtained within Soviet installations.

2. The second half of the briefing, to be given by experienced official travelers to the Soviet Union, such as former military attaches, would deal with various aspects of evasion and harassment likely to be encountered.

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3. For the purposes of this paper, the proposals for simulated evasion and harassment are treated separately.

C. Proposed Operations

1. Harassment

a. Soviet Harassment Techniques: The following list, though not exhaustive, does serve to point up the areas of Soviet harassment which must be considered.*

1) Bureaucratic harassment involving poor living accommodations, transportation failures, low level liaison offices to handle difficulties and delays, failure to provide proper clearances, mishandling of correspondence, numerous misunderstandings, etc.

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* The likely forms which Soviet harassment may take are more fully presented in two related papers:

CIA paper #2892, Some Possible Harassment Techniques for Consideration in Cloud Gap 2. (S)

Simulation of Soviet Harassment and Evasion During Field Tests in the Cloud Gap 9(A) Program (S), 1 October 1964. Prepared for Bendix Systems Division by Browne & Shaw Research Corp. under subcontract [redacted]-0025.

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2) Active harassment such as constant surveillance, persistent escorting, wire-tapping, disrupting utilities, actual or trumped-up charges of infraction of Soviet laws, compromise and intimidation of inspectors, etc.

3) Engagement of inspectors in numerous time consuming and unproductive activities such as propaganda presentations, worker activities, late parties and official gatherings, etc.

4) Public and official hostility and the problems of long-term residence under sub-standard conditions.

b. Harassment Simulation: While it is assumed that the following suggested harassment tactics will be applicable to all the US field test installations, some modifications may be required to suit local conditions.

As a check on the utility of these procedures, it would be considered desirable to have the inspectors report on their observations and reactions to them, if identified, as well as any other supposed or imagined tactics.

As noted earlier, it is not considered possible to provide an entirely realistic harassment program. Nevertheless, there are several tactics that may be employed to stress the verification inspection procedures.

1) Allow the inspector to believe that all methods of harassment will be used against him.

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2) Require escorting for inspectors at all times within the plant.

3) Limit the inspector's access to certain pre-specified areas of the plant.

4) Prevent inspector access to these pre-specified areas on an intermittent basis alleging temporary security restrictions or personal hazards.

5) Require inspector attendance at outside activities such as union and management club meetings.

6) Remove inspectors' GSA cars from use periodically, ostensibly for maintenance, repairs, and safety checks.

7) Require that the inspector engage in intelligence collection activities. (This will be treated in more detail in a later section.)

8) Delay clearances and area accesses.

9) Allow the normally encountered difficulties to become exaggerated before taking corrective action.

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2. Evasion

a. Soviet Evasion Attempts: It is unlikely that the Soviets would attempt evasion within inspected areas of declared facilities; under the noses of the inspectors, so to speak. They would comply strictly with the terms of the treaty in this regard, so long as their intention was to retain the treaty in effect. There are several reasons for this:

1) The risk of detection is high.

2) The net addition to inventory would be minimal without large scale evasion, and gains would be only of marginal value.

3) Evasion on a scale sufficient to appreciably upgrade their strategic capability vis-a-vis the West would be much more easily carried out at undeclared facilities, an evasion problem specifically excluded from consideration here.

In spite of the above reasoning, there are several reasons for pursuing a simulated evasion program.

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1) While actual evasion may not take place in inspected areas, attempts may be made to determine the difficulty in deceiving the inspectorate and to locate weaknesses.

2) Should the Soviets consider it advantageous to bring about an abrogation of the treaty, they may feign overproduction causing the West to abrogate. Upon checking, it would be found that overproduction did not, in fact, exist and the onus of "crying wolf" is transferred to the West.

3) While actual evasion may not take place in inspected areas of declared facilities, an attempt may be made to carry out clandestine production in uninspected areas of these facilities, or to overproduce certain uncontrolled components and assemblies for shipment to undeclared assembly plants.

4) In the event a delivery inspection team is decided upon as an adequate means of production verification in a declared facility, certain modes of evasion become possible that would not be so within the facility.

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